Bibliographical data for
Author
Title of Edited Collection
Open MIND
Editors
Publication Date
January 2015
Publication Place
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
ISBN
9783958570177
Abstract
Bartels and May propose an explanation of the difference between practical and theoretical knowledge in terms of the involvement of non-conceptual and conceptual representations, respectively. They thereby want to alleviate a shortcoming of Stanley’s intellectualist theory of knowledge-how that cannot explain this difference. In this paper it is argued that an appreciation of the fact that both Stanley and Bartels and May employ a semantic reading of propositionality makes clear that their endeavors follow quite different goals. While Stanley gives an analysis of how we talk about knowledge-how, Bartels and May are interested in underlying cognitive representations. From Stanley ’s analysis of knowledge-how, nothing can be inferred about cognitive representations. The semantic reading of propositionality is then spelled out with the help of the idea that ascriptions of propositional attitudes are (like) measurement statements. Some considerations from measurement theory show how propositions can be used to reason about psychological states without themselves having to play any role in a person’s psychology.
Keywords
Anti-intellectualism,
Concepts,
Conceptual representations,
Homomorphic mapping,
Intellectualism,
Knowledge-how,
Measurement,
Measurement theory,
Measurement view,
Mental representation,
Non-conceptual representations,
Personal level,
Propositional attitudes,
Propositionality,
Propositions,
Semantic reading of propositionality