초록
During the Pacific War, problems concerning the future of Korea were actively discussed in the conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR, 1925–1960), which was noted as an international non-governmental organization specializing in problems in the Asia-Pacific region. In its international conferences (Mont Tremblant, Quebec, Canada, 1942; Hot Springs, Virginia, U.S., 1945), decolonization was the most controversial issue because it was deeply concerned with defining not only the war ideology, but also the nature of the postwar world order. The Korean problem was treated in relation to the future of the occupied areas of Japan, and all options were on the table. This article describes what kind of an organization the IPR was, and then goes into the details of the diverse views on the future of Korea in its international conferences. The crux of the matter was choosing either to implement a “mandate” over Korea or to allow Korea “immediate independence” after the war. Chinese, British and American delegates attending the conferences generally expressed the view that international administration or some form of international assistance would be needed during the period prior to full admission of Korea to the international community. However, Andrew J. Grajdanzev, research associate of the International Secretariat of the IPR, argued for the immediate independence of Korea. He also maintained that liberated Korea should build “a cooperative commonwealth” based on the nationalization of its main industries and land reform. His argument seems to have reflected a progressive tendency within the International Secretariat after the Great Depression.
키워드
Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), Pacific War, decolonization, Korean Problem, Andrew J. Grajdanzev
INTRODUCTION
After the Japanese annexation in 1910, Korea became a forgotten nation in the international community. When the nationalist movement brought about open resistance to colonial rule in 1919, Western powers regarded it as an internal affair of Japan and did not show any official response to the Koreans’ appeal. However, following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, the Allied Powers, including the United States, began to re-examine their Korean policy.
During the Pacific War, the international discussions on the Korean problem were held at two levels. First, at the government level, the discussions concerning the future status of Korea took place among the Allied leaders at the various conferences of Cairo, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. Thus, the heads of the United States, United Kingdom, Republic of China, and the Soviet Union reached agreement on the establishment of a joint trusteeship over Korea after the war. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had the leading role in drawing up this agreement, felt that “the Koreans are not yet capable of exercising and maintaining independent government and that they should be placed under a 40-year tutelage.”
Second, at a private level, the Korean problem was actively discussed in the conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR, 1925–1960), which is considered to have been an institutional precursor of today’s international non-governmental organizations specializing in problems in the Asia-Pacific region.
This study first describes what kind of an organization the Institute of Pacific Relations was, and then goes into the details of the diverse views on the future of Korea in its international conferences. It reveals that finding a solution to the Korean problem during the Pacific War was a complex and delicate issue. This was because the Allied Powers, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union, had quite different interests in Korea due to the geopolitical location of the Korean Peninsula. (Just half a century before, Japan had waged wars against China and Russia to occupy Korea.) Even though the IPR was “one of the premier non-governmental organizations operating at the international level for much of the early twentieth century,”
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS IN WARTIME
The Institute of Pacific Relations was founded in 1925 in Hawai‘i by the initiative of American intellectuals, then “only a few far-sighted people,” who realized the need for greater knowledge and understanding of the Asia-Pacific region. They were in a sense “Asia Firsters” who believed that the material prosperity and democracy of America would depend on its expansion to foreign countries, especially into Asia via the Pacific Ocean. The IPR was designed as an unofficial, international, non-partisan association of private national societies in the countries located in or having interests in the Pacific area. Its object, as stated in its constitution, was “to study the conditions of the Pacific peoples with a view to the improvement of their mutual relations.”
In the mid-1930s, the IPR consisted of the following national councils:
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations Australian Institute of International Affairs Canadian Institute of International Affairs China Institute of Pacific Relations Comité d’Etudes des Problèmes du Pacifique (France) Japanese Council, Institute of Pacific Relations Netherlands-Netherlands Indies Council, Institute of Pacific Relations New Zealand Branch, Institute of Pacific Relations Philippine Council, Institute of Pacific Relations Royal Institute of International Affairs (United Kingdom) U.S.S.R. Council, Institute of Pacific Relations
Each national council was autonomous with its own distinctive organization and program. All of them were devoted to research, discussion, and publication on the political, economic, and diplomatic problems of the Far East and the Pacific. They stood for “objective fact-finding,” “free discussion” in which many view points were represented, and the dissemination of reliable, up-to-date information on contemporary problems. The international governing body of the IPR was the Pacific Council, consisting of one member appointed by each national council. The International Secretariat, under the direction of the Pacific Council, maintained liaison among the national councils to coordinate their activities. It also published an international quarterly review,
The IPR’s activities consisted of two closely related parts: (1) an international conference held at two or three year intervals, and (2) a variety of research programs on both the national and international level, which were closely integrated with the international conference. Overall, it should be stressed that at a time when Asian studies were still in the nascent stage in most Pacific countries, the IPR single-handedly took on the task of producing studies, promoting unofficial discussions, and disseminating information related to a variety of problems in the Pacific region.
Even though the IPR was an international body composed of eleven national councils, the American Council and the International Secretariat, both based in New York after 1933, actually led the organization. Meanwhile, with the Great Depression and New Deal policy of the 1930s, some liberal or progressive intellectuals had a predominant role in the American IPR. Three intellectuals, namely Edward C. Carter (1878–1954), Owen Lattimore (1900–1989), and Frederick V. Field (1905–2000), are especially worth noting. As Secretary General of the International Secretariat from 1933 to 1946, Carter contributed greatly to the enhancement of the IPR’s global positioning. Lattimore, a self-educated expert on China and Central Asia, joined the IPR as the editor of
The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 posed a sharp challenge to the IPR because it seemed to make a mockery of the previous efforts of the organization, dedicated as they had been to improving diplomacy in the Pacific.
The outbreak of the Pacific War on December 7, 1941, was the beginning of “the most eventful period in IPR history.” On that day, the war in the Far East merged with the conflict in Europe to become World War II.
The new emergency demands raised the question of whether the IPR should reconsider its program and change its whole emphasis. With regard to this matter, Ray Lyman Wilbur, Chairperson of the American Council, announced:
The immediate job of the American people is the prosecution of war against the military imperialism of Japan and the other Axis powers, whose defeat is the condition of any peaceful adjustment in the Far East and elsewhere. The tradition of the IPR does not permit “neutrality” in this issue; on the contrary, military aggression, in complete disregard of the rights of other peoples, contradicts everything the IPR has stood for. … Ultimately, when the Axis―with which Japan has tragically cast her lot―is defeated, there may come the opportunity for establishing a genuine new order in the Pacific.
In support of this aim, the American Council used its full resources. As “the foremost private center of Far Eastern and Pacific studies in the world,” the IPR proved to be a storehouse of specialized knowledge, materials, and people.
Because of the presence of so many members of other councils in wartime Washington, the Pacific Council established an office in Washington in co-operation with the American Council. This office had as its chief purpose close liaison between the staffs of the two Councils and the government agencies concerned with the Far East, the Embassies and the war missions of the other United Nations. The second function of the office was to facilitate a series of study groups on Pacific problems, utilizing the great concentration of competent experts now in Washington. The first in this series was a study group on China’s postwar economic problems, which drew together a number of Chinese and American experts from New York and Washington.
It should be noted here that Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek approached the IPR during the Pacific War. In August 1943, Secretary General Carter received an urgent and unsolicited invitation from Generalissimo Chiang to come at once to Chungking for the specific purpose of building and strengthening the Chinese IPR.
(1) What is the situation in India? (2) What is the American attitude toward Korea? (3) What will British policy in the Pacific be after the war? (4) What is the attitude of the American people to those two parts of war being waged in Europe and the Pacific? (5) What can I do to strengthen the China IPR so that it can play its full role in the international body?
We do not know Carter’s answers to these questions. However, it is certain that Generalissimo Chiang was anxious to know American and British public opinion and government policies toward the postwar Asia-Pacific region, especially colonial countries like India and Korea.
8 American Institute of Pacific Relations,
9 For the details of each national council at the outbreak of the Pacific War, refer to Institute of Pacific Relations, “Interim Report of the International Secretariat, 1939–1942,” IPR Fonds in the University of British Columbia Archives (IPR Fonds-UBCA), box 45-4.
10 American IPR,
11 Yutaka Sasaki, Ph.D. dissertation, 7–10.
12 Ibid., 12–22; Alan Raucher, op. cit., 498–500.
13 For details, refer to John N. Thomas,
14 American IPR,
15 Yutaka Sasaki, Ph.D. dissertation, 34–35.
16 American IPR,
17 American Council,
18 Ibid., 23.
19 Ibid., 8.
20 American IPR,
21 Tomoko Akami, op. cit., 249–254.
22 American Council,
23 Letter from Robert D. Calkins to Charles Loomis (1943/08/17), IPR Records in the University of Hawai‘i Archives (IPR Records-UHA), E-35/3.
24 Pacific Council of the IPR, “Atlantic City Meeting-Report of the Secretary General” (bound volume, 1944), 4-5, IPR Fonds-UBCA, box 54-3.
THE EIGHTH PACIFIC CONFERENCE AND THE KOREAN PROBLEM
The Eighth International Conference of the IPR was held at Mont Tremblant in the Province of Quebec, Canada, from December 4–14, 1942. This Conference was a “great milestone in the history of the IPR.”
The American delegates included Lauchlin Currie (Administrative Assistant to the President of the United States), Stanley K. Hornbeck (Advisor on Political Relations, Department of State), Maxwell M. Hamilton (Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State), C. F. Remer (Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Office of Strategic Services), James H. Shoemaker (Chairman, Board of Review of the Enemy Branch, Board of Economic Warfare), and Elbert D. Thomas (U.S. Senator from Utah, Democrat). The British delegation was led by Lord Hailey, a retired Governor of the Punjab and the United Provinces in India, and the then Chairman of the governing body of the School of Oriental and African Studies. He was “an effective propagandist and a god-send for the defense of the British Empire.” He was engaged in developing the idea of “partnership” between Britain and her dependent territories, as distinct from schemes for some form of international supervision for all colonies. The Chinese delegation consisted of both Chungking and Washington officials as well as scholars. Its chairman was Sao-ke Alfred Sze (Shih Chao-chi, 施肇基), formerly ambassador to London and Washington. They all took part in the conference in a “private” capacity.
It should also be noted that for the first time an Indian group and a “Free Thai” member attended the conference, and for the first time since 1927 a Korean, Younghill Kang (Kang Yong-hŭl, 姜鏞訖, 1903–1972), attended independently as an observer. His introductory profile was as follows:
Principal Economic Analyst of Board of Economic Warfare. Professor of Department of English, New York University (on leave of absence) and staff member of Metropolitan Museum of Art (on leave of absence). Formerly, Editorial staff member of Encyclopedia Britannica. Guggenheim Foundation Fellow on Creative Literature, 1933–35. Author of
Although he was the first Korean writer to be widely known in the American literary world, he had not taken an active part in the Korean nationalist movement in the United States.
The main theme of the conference was the wartime and postwar cooperation of the United Nations. The round table discussions covered a variety of issues, including the future of colonial dependencies, the treatment of Japan after its defeat, and a broad outline of postwar international organization in the Pacific. Among them, the most contentious issue was how to apply the ideals and principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter to the world, especially to the dependencies of the colonial powers. The Charter, a joint declaration released by the United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on August 14, 1941, laid the basic democratic principles on which the postwar world would be reconstructed, including collective security, self-determination, disarmament, liberal economic international order, and racial equality. Especially the third article of the Charter, on the subject of sovereign rights and self-government, was interpreted as a challenge to colonial rule. It indicated the need for a new system of governance. China as well as colonies in Asia used it as a strong reference point to argue for equal status with, or independence from, colonial powers.
On this issue, a sharp conflict of opinions surfaced between the American and British delegates at Mont Tremblant. The American members expressed a considerable degree of suspicion and criticism of British imperial policies in Asia. Tyler Dennett (1883–1949), former historical adviser of the Department of State, emphasized in his memorandum to the conference that the American people would like to see a liquidation of the prewar colonial system and the abandonment of all kinds of imperial preferences. He explained, “the American soldier does not understand that he is fighting to restore to any European colonial power its lost position in Asia. This is a state of mind to be described but not to be argued with. It is just a fact.”
Under the heavy fire of criticism from members of the United States, Chinese, Canadian, Australian and Indian groups, the British and the Dutch members countered such assertions. For example, in the final plenary session, one Briton asserted that while Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter did not mean granting the immediate and unconditional independence of colonial areas, it did mean that full liberation and independence of colonial areas would be achieved when they arrived at a stage at which they could set up a form of government consistent with “modern ideas of civilization.” To this end, he explained the British government in its colonial policies had already engaged in promoting the growth of self-governing institutions for the dependent areas and felt no hesitation to do anything possible to hasten the process. In short, he emphatically stated that as far as the British were concerned, the days of old imperialism characterized by domination and acquisition were already gone, and that they now had “quite a new concept of imperialism.”
While decolonization was arising as the most controversial issue, the Korean problem was discussed in relation to the future of the occupied areas of Japan. On this matter, the Chinese group took the lead. According to the rapporteur’s report on “Regional Round Table-Japan,” a Chinese member very explicitly stated China’s position. First, he said, China would ask that Manchuria be returned unconditionally. No international regime was acceptable. Second, Formosa likewise was Chinese from every point of view. It should revert to China with no strings attached. Third, Korea was entitled to complete independence on all counts.
From these points in the Chinese statement, there was no dissent in the round table except that some debate developed around the future of Korea. The question was raised whether steps were not necessary to assure that an independent Korea, situated as it was in the Northeast Asia triangle, did not become a springboard of attack against China, the Soviet Union or even Japan. It was suggested that Korea was a good place for the United States to assume a mandate. American responsibility for Korea would be the best guarantee of the security of the area―better even than international control.
To this, the American members replied: (1) This would be a difficult assignment technically for the United States, to say the least. (2) More importantly, it would be regarded by United States’ public opinion as an extremely retrogressive step. It would look like parceling out colonies among the victors―“straight imperialism.” (3) Independence for Korea was the only course consistent with our war aims, and should be supplemented only by an inter-national guarantee and international aid in rebuilding Korea’s national life if she requested aid, under the auspices of whatever international body emerged in the Pacific area.
The Korean problem was further discussed in another round table (“Topical Round Table: Political-Military Problems”). At this time there was agreement that Korea must be taken away from Japan. There was further agreement that following a long period of harsh Japanese administration, the country would be found in a very weak condition, clearly unable to stand entirely by itself. It was also the consensus that whatever was done regarding Korea must be done speedily for the purpose of strengthening and rehabilitating the country and its people.
The proposals for postwar Korea took two directions: the first was that Korea should be assigned to the United States as a mandate—subject, of course, to supervision and inspection by the regional organization. This proposal received rather strong support from some of the Chinese and Canadians present. The second proposal called for a United Nations declaration guaranteeing the independence of Korea immediately after the war and simultaneously guaranteeing her security from outside aggression. It also entailed asserting the willingness of the United Nations to provide any form of assistance Korea might request through the Regional Council. In the event of this solution being adopted, some members believed that the United States might be asked by the Regional Council to play a very prominent role in aiding Korea. The round table, however, did not reconcile these two proposals.
As is apparent in the summary of the round table discussions above, the crux of the Korean problem was choosing either to allow Korea immediate independence after the war or to implement a mandate over Korea. Concerning this matter, we need to pay attention to two persons, namely, Hugh Byas (1875–1945) and Andrew J. Grajdanzev (1899–?). Byas, former Tokyo correspondent for
Korea’s case was different [from Formosa]. Korea is definitely a separate country with a racially distinct people whose leaders naturally want independence. But to thrust self-government on Korea in its present stage of development would be a cruel gift. Administration have to be trained, standards built up; an intelligent but wholly inexperienced people has to be protected from native exploitation while it learns how to use the [machinery] of representative government. Korea is separated from Japan by only one hundred miles of sea, and Japan cannot disinterest itself in Korea’s future since Korea, either helpless, as she was before, or dominated by a hostile power, is a mortal danger to Japan. …… My conclusion would be that, after an interval which should be distinctly stated in the treaty, Japan should be, under supervision, entrusted with the mandatory role in respect of Korea.
In short, Byas justified his argument for Japan’s mandatory role over Korea after the war on the grounds of Korea’s geographical position and the Korean people’s lack of ability of self-government. His views of Korea were reflected in the following British memorandum to the conference: “The United Nations may decide to terminate Japanese control in Korea, but it is difficult to imagine Korea as anything but a very weak and disorderly State for a long time to come and it might become a field for political rivalry between China and Russia.” On the other hand, the paper emphasized that the Korean peasantry under Japanese rule had got the benefit, such as it was, of the improved economic conditions resulting from “the maintenance of peace and order.”
Grajdanzev, a Russian with long experience in Manchuria and Tientsin and a research associate of the International Secretariat of IPR since 1938,
What is more interesting is his claim that a newly independent Korea should become “a cooperative commonwealth.” He noted that the fall of the Japanese regime would permit the complete eradication of the social wrongs of the old Korean regime, and that a possible solution for the central problem of Korean reconstruction should be the nationalization of industry and of land, and a great advance in cooperation.
In the meantime, the Chinese members, having a more profound interest in Korea than most other participants, assumed an ambiguous attitude. For example, S. R. Chow (Zuo Gengsheng, 周鯁生, 1889–1971), professor of international law of Wuhan National University, stated in his paper that there was no reason why this once independent kingdom, with a population of 22 million and a civilization even more ancient than that of the Japanese, should not be given political freedom after Japan’s defeat. Then, he stressed the importance of “a period of tutelage” during which the native peoples of pre-war colonies or dependencies, owing to their political immaturity, would have an opportunity to prepare themselves for self-government.
Finally, if it should appear that the Korean people, after liberation from the Japanese yoke, still need friendly advice and assistance in the initial stages of their political freedom, the United States would be in the best position to assume this responsibility. This is true not only because of American disinterestedness and the traditional friendship which exists between the United States and Korea, but also because American financial resources would be needed to help the newly freed country in its effort to rebuild a national life.
As stated above, Chow intimated that Korea would need America’s support for a period of years after the war. Interestingly, Dennett expressed the view in his memorandum to the conference that “probably the United States would do a good deal for Korea.”
25 Letter from Robert D. Calkins to Charles Loomis (1942/12/18), IPR Records-UHA, E-9b/16.
26 International Secretariat, IPR ed.,
27 Ibid., Part VI. Conference Membership, 153–162.
28 For the composition and characteristics of delegates of each country to the Conference, refer to Yutaka Sasaki, Ph.D. dissertation, 194–206; Christopher G. Thorne, op.cit., 212–214.
29 “Revised Who’s Who: Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacifìc Relations” (Confidential) in the letter from Robert D. Calkins to Charles Loomis (1942/12/18), IPR Records-UHA, E-9b/16, 5.
30 Uk-tong Kim,
31 “Rapporteur’s Report: Plenary Session on Group II Round Tables” (December 9, 1942), IPR Fonds-UBCA, box 51-9, 3, 7.
32 Tomoko Akami, op. cit., 266–267; Yutaka Sasaki, Ph.D. dissertation, 183–184.
33 Tyler Dennett,
34 International Secretariat, IPR ed.,
35 “Rapporteur’s Report: Plenary Session on Group II Round Tables” (December 9, 1942), IPR Fonds-UBCA, box 51-9, 7. The rapporteur was W. W. Lockwood (Secretary, American Council of the IPR).
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 “Rapporteur’s Report: Plenary Session on Group III Round Tables” (December 12, 1942), 6, IPR Fonds-UBCA, box 51-9. The rapporteur was Frederick V. Field (Chairman, Editorial Board of
39 Ibid., 6–7.
40 For a short introduction to his life and activities in Japan, refer to Peter B. Oblas,
41 Hugh Byas,
42 “A Prelminary Survey,”
43 His educational background is as follows: 1899, Born in Ussolye, Siberia, Russia; 1922–23, Polytechnical Institute of Machanics (Irkutsk, Siberia); 1923–24, State University (Irkutsk, Siberia); 1924–28, B.A., M.A., School of Law and Economics (Harbin, Manchuira); 1934–37, Research Worker of the Institute of Economics, Nankai University (Tientsin, China); 1937–38, M.A., University of California (Berkeley); 1939–43, Ph.D., Columbia University (New York). “Project: Study of the Town of Fukaya, Conducted by Dr. A. J. Grad [Grajdanzev]” (1948/05/26), IPR Papers, Rare Books and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, box 315. For details, refer to Ko Chŏng-hyu, “A. J. Kŭrach’ŭtanjep’ŭ wa《Hyŏndae Han’guk》” [A. J. Grajdanzev and
44 Andrew J. Grajdanzev, “Memorandum on Korean Government and Politics,” International Secretariat [of the IPR] Paper No.10 (December 1942), 13, 16. This paper was a preliminary draft of two chapters intended for inclusion in a book,
45 Ibid., 20.
46 S. R. Chow, “The Pacific after the War,”
47 Ibid., 80.
48 Tyler Dennett,
49 Ibid., 8–11, 15, 18–19.
THE NINTH PACIFIC CONFERENCE AND THE KOREAN PROBLEM
The Ninth International Conference of the IPR was held at Hot Springs, Virginia (United States) from January 5–17, 1945. In the last stage of the Second World War, more than 150 delegates from twelve countries attended the conference.
According to a confidential report of the U.S. Department of State, the national delegations at the conference differed markedly in the abilities of their members, in the tactics they employed, and in the prominence they assumed in the discussions. The British group was in some respects the strongest, possessing many able members and presenting a solidly united front on most questions. The Chinese delegation was not outstanding. Its members generally presented a united front in formal meetings but appeared to hold divergent and not always clearly thought out opinions on some of the leading problems in personal conversations. The French and the Dutch tended to follow the British lead in the Dependent Areas discussions. The Indian delegation was voluble but generally ineffective. The Korean, “Free Thai,” and Philippine delegations confined themselves as a rule to prepared statements relating directly to their own countries.
The question of Korean participation in the conference was decided at the Atlantic City meeting of the Pacific Council in January 1944. After that, Secretary General Carter wrote to five Korean organizations in the United Sates and asked them to nominate three qualified Koreans who would be invited to the Hot Springs Conference as observers. In the letter the following was emphasized: “The IPR is desirous that all who attend its Conference should be able to contribute from their own knowledge and experience and also stimulate further investigation and research on Pacific problems. Koreans whose names we would like to have you suggest should therefore have outstanding research experience and recent knowledge of conditions in Korea.”
The Korean delegation comprised three members: Dr. Henry Chung (Chŏng Han-gyŏng, 鄭翰景, 1890–1985), a member of the Korean Commission in Washington, D.C.; Ilhan New (Yu Ir-han, 柳一韓, 1895–1971), Chairman of Korea Economic Society in New York; and Dunn Jacob Kyuang (Chŏn Kyŏng-mu, 田耕武, 1900–1947), Secretary of Public Relations, United Korean Committee in America. Born in Korea’s northwest region (P’yongan Province) and educated in America since childhood, they were playing an active role in the Korean independence movement during the Pacific War, especially to obtain the United States recognition of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in exile, which was by this time in Chungking, China. They hoped that the new, postwar Korea would form a government similar to that of the United States.
The agenda of the Hot Springs conference was extremely comprehensive, with the result that almost all Far Eastern current and postwar problems received some measure of attention. Topics which stood out particularly were the treatment of defeated Japan, postwar Far Eastern economic development, the advancement of dependent peoples, and collective security in the Pacific. Decolonization continued to be the most divisive topic among participants. Along with the Chinese and Indian members, many North American members attacked European colonialism. This shocked and angered members from Britain, France, and the Netherlands. European groups were not ready to commit to the self-determination of colonies or to give up their colonial rights. They insisted on the “native’s incompetence to self-govern” and explained colonialism as the “white man’s burden.”
Regarding Korea, the Cairo Declaration was a reference point for the discussion. The Declaration, released by the United States, Republic of China, and the United Kingdom on December 1, 1943, said that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” This obscure phrase attracted considerable attention at the conference. Many questioned how long “in due course” was likely to be. A British member stated:
Judging partly from the experience of Burma, it is likely to take a long time to place Korea on a stable, independent basis. Someone will have to create a whole corpus of law and work out tariff and customs arrangements. Korea has been so closely integrated with the Japanese economic system that it will require a major surgical operation to separate them. Who will meet the cost? The resources of Korea may be quite inadequate. It may take years to establish a satisfactory working administration.
Contrary to the British view, Korean delegates expressed the hope that Korea would regain full sovereignty in the shortest possible time, not exceeding six months. They emphasized the geographical and cultural homogeneity and economic self-sufficiency of their country as arguments why an independent Korea could be quickly established. It was their belief that their people would, after a very short period, be as well or better qualified for independence than the Filipinos. They conceded that a military government led by foreign countries might be necessary for up to two years, but assured participants a provisional Korean government could be established within six months of the country’s liberation. They also explained that a tutelary government of the Great Powers should not be necessary at all, but, if deemed necessary, should be by several rather than by one or two powers. If a single power was deemed necessary, Korea’s preference was the United States.
In the round table discussions on collective security, a Korean member stated that his country had two main interests: first, “to get rid of Japanese domination,” and second, to secure international cooperation, particularly by the Great Powers, in establishing Korean independence. In his view, Korean independence required the establishment of an effective international organization. Due to its history and its geographical situation, Korea was vulnerable to aggression. Japan, of course, had to be disarmed, but Korea welcomed the growth of a strong [Nationalist] China. An interim arrangement among the Great Powers in which Korean peace and security could be guaranteed was seen as potentially valuable. Korea, however, did not desire to remain a protégé of the Great Powers. “She wished to stand on her own feet as early as possible.”
Chinese members, in general, appeared to sympathize with the views of the Korean delegation, but some sided with the British, saying that “the problem is not as simple as our Korean friends would have us think.”
Meanwhile, the American delegation had reached agreement on Korea’s postwar status in the preliminary meeting in October 1944:
It was generally agreed that a one-country mandate for Korea would be undesirable. International administration or some forms of international assistance were proposed as alternatives during the period prior to full admission of Korea to the international community. It was suggested that perhaps no valid reason exists for denying Korean full independence after hostilities cease in the Far East and that recognition of such a status with offers of international assistance might be the best policy in relation to general security and economic development in the Pacific.
At the Hot Springs conference an American member suggested that “in due course” might be taken to mean “as soon as an election can be called.” Another member proposed that full Korean independence be recognized, that Korea be encouraged to develop a provisional government as rapidly as possible, and that the United Nations forces in Korea be withdrawn as soon as a provisional government was established.
In these statements, the American delegation seemed to favor the view of the Korean members. But Dennett, an American authority on the Far East, publicly expressed that a premature recognition of Korean sovereignty might leave it, as in 1882, an object of international rivalries— economic, strategic and ideological—with only the illusion of the security that thus far had been blueprinted. Thus he concluded: “The best that the Koreans could hope for, after the Japanese have been driven out, is a considerable period of international protection, direction, and support, comparable with the earlier stages of the American administration of the Philippines.”
At this point, Grajdanzev’s view of the Korean problem must be considered. In an article published in
As Grajdanzev stated, Soviet Russia had a strong interest in Korea. But it did not participate in the IPR conferences in 1942 and 1945 because of “wartime conditions.”
Although the participants at the conference, taken as a whole, expressed their desires for Russia’s positive role in the postwar world, there were underlying fears of its potential threat to their objectives. For example, Chiang Kai-shek had told Lattimore, once his American advisor, that Korea should be a “semi-independent [state] under American and Chinese tutelage” to exclude Russian influence from that peninsula.
50 International Secretariat, IPR ed.,
51 Raymond Dennett, “Report on the Ninth Intemational Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations” (1945/04/26, confidential memorandum), IPR Records-UHA, box A-11/11.
52 Department of State, U.S., “Minutes of The Hot Springs IPR Conference” (1945/01/25, Confidential),
53 E. C. Carter to Korean Commission, United Korean Committee in America, Sino-Korean Peoples’ League, Korean Affairs Institute, Korean Economic Society (1944/10/10), IPR Papers, Columbia University, box 349.
54 Henry Chung,
55 Planning and Research Board of the United Korean Committee in America,
56 Tomoko Akami, op. cit., 271–272.
57 Department of State, “Minutes of the Hot Springs IPR Conference,” 1283.
58 Ibid., 1282–1283.
59 Department of State, “Minutes of the Hot Springs IPR Conference,” 1293.
60 Ibid., 1283.
61 S. R. Chow,
62 “Preliminary Meeting of American Delegation to the 1945 Conference” (1944/10/28, Confidential), IPR Records-UHA, box A-11/4.
63 International Secretariat, IPR ed.,
64 Tyler Dennett, “In Due Course,”
65 A. J. Grajdanzev, “Korea in the Postwar World,”
66 “Minutes of Meeting of the Pacific Council: Hot Springs, Virginia” (1945), IPR Fonds-UBCA,box 54-4, 5.
67 International Secretariat, IPR ed.,
68 Xiaoyuan Liu, “Sino-American Diplomacy over Korea during World War II,”
69 Ibid., 251.
CONCLUSION
Daizaburō Yui (油井大三郞), a professor at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo, attempted an interesting analysis on the role of American intellectuals in drawing up and implementing reform plans for postwar Japan. According to his book, progressive scholars affiliated with the International Secretariat and the American Council of the IPR during the Pacific War desired “a thorough democratic reform from the bottom up” in postwar Japan. They actually had a direct involvement in the initial reforms of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP),
Something similar took place in Korea. When Japan was defeated in 1945, the Korean people hoped for complete independence and radical changes in the structure of the Japanese colonial governance, such as the purge of Korean collaborators with Imperial Japan, land reforms, and the nationalization of main industries. It was Grajdanzev, researcher of the International Secretariat of the IPR, who actively spoke on behalf of the Korean people. He believed that the most effective way to dissolve the feudal system or fascism in East Asia was through revolutionary land reforms. He also considered complete dissolution of the Japanese Empire crucial to stabilization and peace in postwar East Asia. His insistence on the establishment of a “centralized democratic republic” in liberated Korea was one way to prevent the revival of Japan as a “New Empire.”
China came under the control of the Communists in 1949, and the Korean War broke out in the following year. McCarthyism gained strength in the United States as its foreign policy toward East Asia turned out a failure. The IPR, an aggregate of Asia experts within the United States, became the first victim of this movement. Joseph R. McCarthy, a senator from Wisconsin, criticized Lattimore as “one of the principal architects of our Far Eastern policy” and accused him of pro-Communist leanings.
70 The term “Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)” refers both to the person who embodied that position and the supporting bureaucracy.
71 Daizaburō Yui,
72 Andrew J. Grajdanzev, “Problems of Korean Independence,”
73 Robert Griffith,
74 Andrew J. Grad to Mr. Holland (1951/8/28, 1952/4/25), IPR Papers, Columbia University, box 265. Grajdanzev changed his name to Grad after the acquisition of American citizenship in the mid-1940s.
75 Andrew J. Grad,
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1 Department of State, U.S.,United States Policy Regarding Korea, 1834–1950 (Chuncheon: Insititute of Asian Culture Studies, Hallym University, 1987), 86.
2 Bruce Cumings,The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 104–109.
3 See ibid, Chapter 3; Soon Sung Cho,Korea in World Politics, 1940–1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility (Berkeley and Los Angles: University of California Press, 1967); James Irving Matray,The Reluctant Crusade : American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950 (Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Tae-yŏl Ku, Han’guk kukche kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu [A study on the history of Korea’s international relations], 2 (Sŏul: Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, 1995); Yong-uk Chŏng, Haebang chŏnhu Miguk ŭi taehan chŏngch’aek [United States policy toward Korea before and after the Liberation], (Sŏul: Sŏul Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 2003).
4 As regards the historiography of the Institute of Pacific Relations, refer to Yutaka Sasaki, “The Struggle for Scholarly Objectivity: Unofficial Diplomacy and the Institute of Pacific Relations from the Sino-Japanese War to the McCarthy Era,” Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey-New Brunswick, 2005, 22–31.
5 For details, see ibid., Chapter 3–5; Tomoko Akami,Internationalizing the Pacific: the United States, Japan, and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919–45 (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), Chapter 9; Alan Raucher, “The First Foreign Affairs Think Tanks,” American Quarterly , 30-4 (Autumn 1978), 493–513; Christopher G. Thorne, Allies of a Kind: the United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 209–214.
6 Lawrence T. Woods, “Letters in Support of the Institute of Pacific Relations: Defending a Nongovernmental Organization,”Pacific Affairs , 76-4 (Winter 2003/2004), 611.
7 William L. Holland, “Source Materials on the Institute of Pacific Relations,”Pacific Affairs , 58-1 (Spring 1985), 91–97.