Agents and Norms Inside the Firm: Compliance Officials, Risk Analysis and Compliance Behaviors

42 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2008 Last revised: 13 Aug 2014

See all articles by Robert Rosen

Robert Rosen

University of Miami - School of Law

Christine Parker

Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne

Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen

University of Aarhus - Department of Political Science

Date Written: April 15, 2008

Abstract

In making decisions about their compliance with the law, firms are constrained not only by their environment, but also their agents' understanding of whose (or what) interests the corporation should serve. In particular, compliance officials' understandings will frame and influence their calculation of the value, benefits and costs of compliance activities. Corporate cultures regarding risk and compliance may contain not only instrumental and adaptive elements, but also latent identities. This paper uses data from a survey of the officials responsible for compliance in 999 large Australian businesses to examine (1) perceptions of the costs and benefits of compliance; and (2) reports of the firms' compliance cultures and activities.

Keywords: regulation, norms, firm behavior, professions

JEL Classification: K22, K42, L21, L84, M14

Suggested Citation

Rosen, Robert Eli and Parker, Christine and Nielsen, Vibeke Lehmann, Agents and Norms Inside the Firm: Compliance Officials, Risk Analysis and Compliance Behaviors (April 15, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1121171 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1121171

Robert Eli Rosen (Contact Author)

University of Miami - School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 248087
Room 370
Coral Gables, FL 33124
United States
305-284-4801 (Phone)
305-284-6506 (Fax)

Christine Parker

Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne ( email )

University Square
185 Pelham Street, Carlton
Victoria, Victoria 3010
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://law.unimelb.edu.au/about/staff/christine-parker

Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen

University of Aarhus - Department of Political Science ( email )

Bartholins Allé è
DK-8000 Aarhus, 8000
Denmark

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