^* For helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, we are indebted to Fred I. Greenstein, Kenneth P. Langton, Richard G. Niemi, and Jeffrey S. Obier. The research was supported by a National Science Foundation grant to the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

¹ For a discussion of these models, see Easton, David and Dennis, Jack, Children in the Political System (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969), Chapter 2.Google Scholar

² At the same time, it should be emphasized that scholars engaged in this research do not suppose that political man is but the political child writ large. Quite the contrary. All agree that political socialization continues throughout the life cycle; that not all childhood learning influences adult behavior; and that, in dynamic modern societies, political attitudes are rarely transmitted unchanged from one generation to another. The childhood focus stems instead from an interest in exploring how political attitudes develop. Fred Greenstein nicely summarizes this concern as an attempt “to identify who learns what, from whom, under what circumstances and with what effects.” See Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 12.

³ Once again, Greenstein has succinctly summarized this position: “In general, the more important a political orientation is in the behavior of adults, the earlier it will be found to emerge in the learning of the child” (p. 56). In fact, a widely accepted belief holds that many political orientations have been acquired by the time children leave the eighth grade, and that little change occurs thereafter. The strongest statement of this position is that of James C. Davies: Political socialization “begins at about the age of three and is basically completed by the age of thirteen.” See “The Family's Role in Political Socialization,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 361 (September, 1965), 11.

⁴ Cf. Hyman, Herbert, Political Socialization (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959)Google Scholar; Greenstein, Children and Politics; Hess, Robert D. and Torney, Judith V., The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967)Google Scholar; Dawson, Richard E. and Prewitt, Kenneth, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969)Google Scholar; Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political System.

⁵ “This is not to argue that specific political attitudes are not important; indeed they are much more reliable guides to political action than beliefs about politics in general,” (Verba, Sidney, “Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture,” in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. Pye, Lucin W. and Verba, Sidney [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965], p. 518).Google Scholar

⁶ Hyman, pp. 56–57. Greenstein, Easton and Dennis, Hess and Torney, and others, make a similar linkage argument with particular reference to the system persistence model. Each reports that American school children hold an exceptionally benign image of the President. (For a representative example, see, Greenstein, pp. 27–54.)

⁷ Easton and Dennis, p. 5.

⁸ For example, see Greenstein, pp. 28–31.

⁹ McClosky, Herbert, “Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation,” in Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. Rosenau, James N. (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 51–109.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Prothro, James W. and Grigg, Charles M., “Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement,” Journal of Politics, 22 (May, 1960), 276–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also McClosky, Herbert, “Consensus and Ideology in American Politics,” American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 361–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ McClosky, , “Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation,” pp. 56, 92–93.Google Scholar

¹² See McGuire, William J., “The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change,” in The Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. Lindzey, Gardner and Aronson, Elliott, 2nd ed. Vol. III (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 151–52.Google Scholar

¹³ Dawson, and Prewitt, , Political Socialization, pp. 14, 86.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Party identification, for instance, obviously relates to the types of demands citizens make upon the policy process. But party identification may also be viewed as a support for the political system. This point has been argued by Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux: “Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States,” in Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren, Stokes, Donald, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 269–91.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Models of this sort are, in effect, paradigms which orient research and circumscribe the scope of a discipline, or subfields within a discipline. In the present case, this involves definitions of politics and other equally complex issues. Although these models could benefit from careful reconstruction, such a task is clearly beyond the capabilities of the present essay. We have attempted to take the models as they appear in socialization research, and refine them only to the poirt necessary for diagrammatic representation and discussion in an intelligible manner.

¹⁶ David Easton defines “demands” as follows: “… an expression of opinion that an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible for doing so.” (A Systems Analysis of Political Life [New York: Wiley, 1965], p. 38).

¹⁷ This is not to say that the relationship between demands and outputs is unimportant: only that its examination is beyond the capabilities of our immediate concerns. Like the relationship between supports and system persistence, this involves the difficult problem of relating individual to system level data. It also necessitates further clarification of the variables involved. See, Greenstein, Fred, “A Note on the Ambiguity of ‘Political Socialization,’ Definitions, Criticisms and Strategies of Inquiry,” Journal of Politics, 32 (November, 1970), 969–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ Dawson and Prewitt, pp. 204–05; Langton, Kenneth P., Political Socialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 14–16.Google Scholar

¹⁹ While demands can also contribute to system stability and persistence, the model usually emphasizes support variables when it is discussed in the socialization literature.

²⁰ For example, citizens with strong affect for the presidency may support this institution, contributing to system stability by being uncritical of presidential actions in domestic and international affairs: Dawson and Prewitt, p. 59. More specifically, Americans are said to support their government by fighting its wars, paying its taxes, and obeying its laws: Mitchell, William C., The American Polity (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 172.Google Scholar

²¹ Easton, and Dennis, , Children in the Political System, pp. 61–67.Google Scholar See also, Easton, David, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 124–26.Google Scholar

²² An example from system persistence research will put this in sharper perspective. Easton and Dennis suggest that early affect for the President may be generalized into high trust toward governmental institutions. This is particularly important for adults who may be dissatisfied with the actions of incumbents such as Supreme Court Justices. At this point the early acquired trust in government can insulate the institution from citizen wrath. It prevents dissatisfaction with incumbents from “spilling over” into acts of hostility toward the institutions themselves. See Easton, David and Hess, Robert D., “The Child's Political World,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 6 (August, 1962), 242–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Easton and Dennis, p. 9; Hess, and Torney, , Development of Political Attitudes in Children, p. 7Google Scholar; Dawson and Prewitt, p. 43.

²⁴ Greenstein, Fred I., Children and Politics, p. 163.Google Scholar

²⁵ The SERS sample is a national cross-section stratified by race, region, and size of place. This study was a University of North Carolina survey coordinated by Professors Robert G. Lehnen and Thad L. Beyle. It was supported by a Science Development Grant from the National Science Foundation.

²⁶ Converse, Philip E., “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in Ideology and Discontent, ed. Apter, David E. (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 109–13.Google Scholar

²⁷ Several orientations in our analysis have been combined in scales by other studies (e.g., political efficacy). We did not employ such scales for the following reasons: 1) they were rarely used in the socialization studies whose theoretical relevance is under examination; and, 2) as summary measures, they would obscure information about different attitudinal objects (e.g., honesty vs. benevolence of public officials) which we wish to examine separately.

²⁸ Prothro and Grigg.

²⁹ McClosky, “Consensus and Ideology in American Politics.”

³⁰ Converse, , “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” p. 228.Google Scholar See also Free, Lloyd A., and Cantril, Hadley, The Political Beliefs of Americans (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers U. Press, 1967), Chapter 3.Google Scholar

³¹ Luttbeg, Norman R., “The Structure of Beliefs Among Leaders and the Public,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 32 (Fall, 1968), 401–404.Google Scholar

³² Converse, (p. 229) did use one political orientation, political party identification, in his analysis. He found that party preference was “relatively unconnected to issue positions.”

³³ McClosky, , “Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation,” pp. 92–103.Google Scholar

³⁴ The items are quite similar in both studies: (SRC) “Generally speaking do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?” (SERS) “Regardless of how you vote, when it comes to national politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?”; (SRC) “Some people say the government in Washington ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost; others say the government should not get into this. Have you been interested enough in this to favor one side over the other? (If yes) What is your position?” (SERS) “The Government ought to make sure that all people have good health care.” (Agree—Disagree).

³⁵ The items were: “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?” Those responding “Always” were contrasted with those responding “Some of the time” and “None of the time” (the middle category, “Most of the time,” was dropped from the analysis) for their answers to the following questions: “Which of the following do you think we should now do in Vietnam? 1) pull out of Vietnam entirely, 2) keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end the fighting, 3) take a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam.”

³⁶ (SRC) “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?” “How about refusing to obey a law which one thinks is unjust, if the person feels so strongly about it that he is willing to go to jail rather than obey the law. Would you approve of a person doing that, disapprove, or would it depend on the circumstances?” (SERS) “The laws of this country treat all people fairly: Agree—Disagree.”

³⁷ (SRC) “Some people think it is all right for the public schools to start each day with a prayer. Others feel that religion does not belong in the public schools but should be taken care of by the family and the church. Have you been interested enough in this to favor one side over the other? (If yes) Which do you think?” (SERS) “Taxes should be based on how much money people earn: Agree—Disagree.”

³⁸ Converse, Philip E., “New Dimensions of Meaning for Cross-Section Sample Surveys in Politics,” International Social Science Journal, 16 (1964), 19–34Google Scholar, esp. p. 27. It is for this reason that Robert Lane suggests we attempt to explain political issue beliefs by motivational variables (e.g., “Of what use to you is this opinion?”) rather than by political orientations. Political Thinking and Consciousness (Chicago: Markham, 1969), p. 22. But this would be a largely complementary enterprise: a functional explanation (the role of the issue belief in the self system) as opposed to a predictive or genetic explanation. For further discussion of linkage between orientations and issue beliefs, see Greenstein, Fred I., Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969), pp. 124–25.Google Scholar

³⁹ Converse, , “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” p. 213Google Scholar; Aberbach, Joel D. and Walker, Jack L., “The Meanings of Black Power: A Comparison of White and Black Interpretations of a Political Slogan,” American Political Science Review, 64 (June, 1970), 380–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁰ Hyman, Herbert H., Political Socialization, pp. 46–47Google Scholar, 74–75; Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E., and Stokes, Donald E., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 128–36; 194 ff.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Hess, and Torney, , Development of Political Attitudes in Children, p. 211Google Scholar; Converse, , “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” pp. 228–29Google Scholar; Converse, Philip E. and Dupeux, Georges, “Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States,” in Elections and the Political Order, ed. Campbell, Angus, et al. (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 287Google Scholar; and Butler, David and Stokes, Donald, Political Change in Britain (London: St. Martins Press, 1969), pp. 193–94.Google Scholar

⁴² See Greenstein, , Children and Politics, p. 155.Google Scholar

⁴³ Since city officials have little or no capacity to affect certain types of public policy, the following items were excluded from these calculations: approve freedom of religion, approve freedom of speech, government promote good living standards, civil disobedience, government restrict car manufacturers, cooperation with communist countries, and approve foreign aid. In addition, the political cynicism item refers to national authorities. Given findings on the generalization of authority attitudes, it does not seem too far fetched to use this item as an indicator of attitudes toward local authorities as well.

⁴⁴ It may appear that the concept “personality factors” as used in this context, does not reflect a distinct set of variables, much less any developed theory of personality and politics. Our choice of “personality factors,” and their distinction vis-à-vis “political orientations,” was dictated by past literature, availability of data, and the greater prima facie distance between these factors and issue beliefs than is the case with political orientations. This “distance” reflects the distinguishing characteristic of personality factors: independence of short term contextual variation.

⁴⁵ Easton and Dennis, pp. 77–79.

⁴⁶ Greenstein, , Personality and Politics, p. 19.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ The personality items are: Conformist—“When talking with my friends, I should avoid topics that would lead to arguments.” Approve Negroes—“There are many groups in America that try to get the government of the American people to see things more their way. We would like to get your feelings toward some of these groups: Negroes” (score on feeling thermometer).

⁴⁸ It should be noted that our results can be generalized only to a national population. It is, of course, still possible that some orientation/issue-belief relationships may be present for distinct subgroups within this population. Thus far, socialization research has usually been directed toward orientations learned by all members of a society. If research were focused upon orientations particularitistic to subgroups, however, the structuring principle's validity would bear further investigation in these contexts.

⁴⁹ McClosky, , “Consensus and Ideology in American Politics,” p. 374.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Greenstein, , Children and Politics, p. 163.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See: Scriven, Michael, “Explanation and Prediction in Evolutionary Theory,” Science, 130 (August 28, 1959), 477–82CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed, reprinted in The Nature and Scope of Social Science, ed. Krimerman, Leonard I. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 117–25Google Scholar; Brown, Robert, Explanation in Social Science (Chicago: Aldine, 1963)Google Scholar; and, Dray, William, Laws and Explanation in History (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).Google Scholar

⁵² Dennis, Jack has noted that thus far this piece of the puzzle remains implicit in socialization research: “Major Problems of Political Socialization Research,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 12 (February, 1968), 109–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar