¹ Galloway, George B., History of the House of Representatives (New York, 1962), pp. 287–292 Google Scholar; Ripley, Randall B., “The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives,” this Review, 58 (September, 1964), p. 563.Google Scholar

² As Truman, David B. observed in 1959: “Everyone knows something of leaders and leadership of various sorts, but no one knows very much. Leadership, especially in the political realm, unavoidably or by design often is suffused by an atmosphere of the mystic and the magical, and these mysteries have been little penetrated by systematic observation”: The Congressional Party (New York, 1959), p. 94.Google Scholar

³ The most notable exceptions in recent years are White, William S., Citadel: The Story of the U. S. Senate (New York, 1956)Google Scholar and MacNeil, Neil, Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives (New York, 1963).Google Scholar A masterpiece from the past is Poore, Ben Perley, Perley's Reminiscences of Sixty Years in the National Metropolis, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: 1886).Google Scholar

⁴ Two of the best examples are Miller, Clem, Member of the House (New York, 1962)Google Scholar and Boiling, Richard, House Out of Order (New York, 1965).Google Scholar

⁵ Treatment of Speakers seems to be an exception. See, for example, Barnes, James A., John G. Carlisle (New York, 1931)Google Scholar; Blaine, James G., Twenty Yeirs of Congress, from Lincoln to Garfield, 2 vols. (Norwich, Conn., 1884)Google Scholar; McCall, Samuel W., The Life of Thomas B. Reed (Cambridge, 1919)Google Scholar; Robinson, William A., Thomas B. Reed, Parliamentarian (New York, 1930)Google Scholar; Busbey, L. White, Uncle Joe Cannon (New York, 1927)Google Scholar; Clark, Champ, My Quarter Century of American Politics (New York, 1920)Google Scholar; and Timmons, Bascom N., Garner of Texas (New York, 1948).Google Scholar A forthcoming political biography of the late Speaker Rayburn by his staff assistant, D. B. Hardeman, should correct the shortcomings of the only full-length existing biography, Dorough, C. Dwight, Mr. Sam (New York, 1962)Google Scholar, which tells us almost nothing about Rayburn, the legislative leader.

⁶ Chiu, Chang-wei, The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since 1896 (New York, 1927).Google Scholar This Columbia doctoral dissertation builds on a much better Radcliffe thesis first published in 1896: Follett, Mary Parker, The Speaker of the House of Representatives (New York, 1909).Google Scholar Among the more useful older studies on party leadership, see Alexander, DeAlva S., History and Procedure of the House of Representatives (Boston, 1916)Google Scholar; Brown, George R., The Leadership of Congress (Indianapolis, 1922)Google Scholar; and Hasbrouck, Paul D., Party Government in the House of Representatives (New York, 1927).Google Scholar

⁷ See, for example, Truman, op. cit., Matthews, Donald R., U. S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill, 1960)Google Scholar; Huitt, Ralph K., “Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate,” this Review, 55 (June, 1961), 333–344 Google Scholar; Polsby, Nelson W., “Two Strategies of Influence: Choosing a Majority Leader, 1962,” in Peabody, Robert L. and Polsby, Nelson W. (eds.), New Perspectives on the House of Representatives (Chicago, 1963)Google Scholar; Robinson, James A., The House Rules Committee (Indianapolis, 1963)Google Scholar; Randall B. Ripley, “The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives,” op. cit., 561–576; Froman, Lewis A. and Ripley, Randall B., “Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats,” this Review, 59 (March, 1965), 52–63 Google Scholar; and Jones, Charles O., Party and Policy-Making: The House Republican Policy Committee (New Brunswick, 1964).Google Scholar

⁸ The analysis which follows is dependent upon Nelson W. Polsby's study of the Albert-Boiling contest, “Two Strategies of Influence: Choosing a Majority Leader, 1962,” op. cit.; and Peabody, Robert L., “The Ford-Halleck Minority Leadership Contest, 1965,” Eagleton Institute Cases in Practical Politics (New York, 1966), No. 40.Google Scholar The latter study is based on eighty-five interviews with over forty Republican Representatives and staff members during and immediately following the several contests which preoccupied House Republicans from early December, 1964 through February, 1965.

⁹ U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D. C., 1960), pp. 691–692.Google Scholar

¹⁰ For discussion of this problem in the determination of causality, see Blalock, Hubert M. Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill, 1964), pp. 32–33.Google Scholar

¹¹ The attention of journalists and political scientists is naturally drawn to instances of organized revolt. For newspapermen, it is conflict, of course, which makes news. But political scientists need to explore situations where the threatened change does not get beyond the discussion stage, as for example, threats to replace Thomas Kuchel, the incumbent Minority Whip in the United States Senate, at the opening of the 89th Congress, and disgruntlement with Speaker McCormack's leadership at the beginning of the 90th Congress.

¹² In the Republican Party (a) is illustrated by the Miller-McCulloch contest of 1960; (b) by the unsuccessful challenge against Minority Whip Arends in 1965 as well as the famed “revolt” against Speaker Cannon in 1910; and (c) by the minority leadership contests of 1959 and 1965.

¹³ For general discussion of a theory of social exchange, see Talcott Parsons, “On the Concept of Influence,” Coleman, James S., “Comment on ‘On the Concept of Influence,’” Public Opinion Quarterly, 27 (Spring, 1963), 37–62, 63–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Homans, George C., “Social Behavior as Exchange,” American Journal of Sociology, 65 (May, 1960), 545–556 Google Scholar; and Blau, Peter M., Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York, 1964).Google Scholar For more specific applications of exchange theory to legislatures, see Peabody, Robert L., “Organization Theory and Legislative Behavior: Bargaining, Hierarchy and Change in the U. S. House of Representatives” (paper delivered before the American Political Science Association, New York City, 09 7, 1963)Google Scholar; Coleman, James S., “Collective Decisions,” Sociological Inquiry (Spring, 1964), 166–181 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Barber, James D., “Leadership Strategies for Legislative Party Cohesion,” Journal of Politics, 28 (May, 1966), 347–367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ Only one instance of leadership change took place at the opening of the 90th Congress in January, 1967. Representative Dan Rostenkowski of Chicago was elected Chairman of the Democratic Caucus, replacing Eugene Keogh of New York, who had retired at the end of the 89th Congress. All other incumbent leaders, Democrats and Republicans, were re-elected to the positions they held in the previous Congress. In addition, House Republicans converted the Chairmanship of their Committee on Planning and Research from an appointive to an elective position.

¹⁵ A sixth leadership position, Chairman of the Democratic Steering Committee, has been omitted from consideration. This committee, the counterpart to the Republican Policy Committee, was largely dormant throughout this period. Reactivated briefly in 1962 and again in 1965, its chairman is thirteen-term Representative Ray Madden of Indiana, senior administration supporter on the Committee on Rules.

¹⁶ For the Democrats these nine changes consist of the choice of McCormack for Speaker in 1962; Albert for Majority Leader in 1962; Albert and Boggs for Whip in 1955 and 1962; and the five choices for Chairman of the Democratic Caucus (see Table 2). The nine Republican changes in leadership would include the selections of Halleck and Ford for Minority Leader in 1959 and 1965; Byrnes and Rhodes for Policy Committee Chairman in 1959 and 1965; Hoeven, Ford and Laird for Chairman of the Republican Conference in 1957, 1963, and 1965; and Miller and Wilson for Chairman of the Campaign Committee in 1960 and 1961 (see Table 3). In the following section one further case is added, the unsuccessful attempt to remove Arends as Minority Whip in 1965.

¹⁷ This contest comes close to qualifying as the fourth type, challenge to the heir apparent. Excerpts from the interviews reported in Polsby's detailed study of this contest clearly reveal the extent to which members perceived Albert as “‘entitled’ to the job by virtue of his six years' service in the leadership hierarchy of the House.” op. cit., p. 247. But while the pattern of succession from Floor Leader to Speaker has been firmly established, there is only limited precedent for elevating the party Whip to Floor Leader. Oscar Underwood of Alabama served briefly as Minority Whip in 1900–1901, but ten years intervened before he became Majority Floor Leader in 1911. With the possible exception of John Garner of Texas, no other Floor Leader save for Albert had previously served as Whip prior to his first selection as Floor Leader: Ripley, op. cit., p. 563, p. 564, n. 19. Albert, however, was able to capitalize on McCormack's two related experiences of serving as Minority Whip and then moving back up to Majority Leader following the 80th and 83rd Congresses. Boggs' elevation from Deputy Whip to Whip in 1962 was further evidence of a developing pattern.

¹⁸ New York Times, February 28, 1919, p. 1; Chiu, op. cit., pp. 25–27.

¹⁹ Snell moved from 55 votes on the first ballot to a 96 to 64 lead over Tilson on the seventh ballot but still one short of a majority. Before the eighth ballot began, Tilson moved to make the nomination unanimous. New York Times, December 1, 1931, pp. 1, 4; December 8, 1931, pp. 1, 16.

²⁰ Martin, Joe, My First Fifty Years in Politics (as told to Donovan, Robert J.) (New York, 1960), pp. 81–82.Google Scholar

²¹ The best single review of this contest is Jones, op. cit., pp. 29–38. His summary contains one questionable statement: “A poll of members showed that John W. Byrnes of Wisconsin had the most support, Gerald R. Ford, Jr., of Michigan was second, and Halleck was third.” (p. 35). A more plausible interpretation is that the informal polls taken in late December and early January were too indefinite to do much more than suggest that there were several possible candidates with Halleck and Byrnes the front-runners. The insurgents discussed going with Byrnes, but found him reluctant to step out in front of Halleck, an experienced floor leader. When one of their group, former Representative Jack Westland of Washington, discussed the possibilities of a revolt with Halleck in Florida, Halleck insisted on his right as the former Majority Leader to make the challenge. Other contemporary accounts seem to support this interpretation. See, for example, Fryklund, Richard, “Story of G.O.P. Revolt Has Varied Chapters,” Washington Star, January 11, 1959, p. A–1 Google Scholar; Steele, John L., “G.O.P. Tactics That Toppled A Veteran Leader,” Life, January 19, 1959 Google Scholar; and Martin's own version, op. cit., pp. 3–19. I am indebted to Representative Bob Wilson for making available a 69-page scrapbook of clippings and other materials which he kept on this contest.

²² “Ford's Election Sparks Shifts in GOP House Strategy,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 21 (February 8, 1963), 149–156.

²³ Peabody, , “The Ford-Halleck Minority Leadership Contest, 1965,” op. cit., pp. 32–35.Google Scholar

²⁴ Truman, op. cit., pp. 212–227.

²⁵ Kofmehl, Kenneth, “The Institutionalization of a Voting Bloc,” Western Political Quarterly, 17 (June, 1964), 256–272.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁶ Cummings, Milton C. Jr. and Peabody, Robert L., “The Decision to Enlarge the Committee on Rules: An Analysis of the 1961 Vote,” in Peabody, and Polsby, , op. cit., pp. 167–194.Google Scholar

²⁷ The impact of the midterm election of 1966 on prospective leadership change at the beginning of the 90th Congress adds further support to these generalizations. Republicans made a net gain of 47 House seats, but fell 31 seats short of winning control. The party breakdown for the 90th Congress was 248 Democrats and 187 Republicans. A principal effect of the election was to consolidate Ford's position as Minority Leader. Although the House Democratic majority leadership came in for some criticism and floor setbacks in the opening months, their leadership positions were not directly contested.

²⁸ Excerpt from an unpublished newsletter of the late Representative Clem Miller, January-February, 1962, p. 3.

²⁹ For evidence of such effects in an earlier Congress, the 81st, see Truman, op. cit., pp. 231–246.

³⁰ Truman, op. cit., p. 245; Huitt, op. cit., pp. 336–337.

³¹ For an attempt to more fully analyze the consequences of Ford's defeat of Halleck in 1965, see Peabody, Robert L., “House Republican Leadership: Change and Consolidation in a Minority Party” (paper delivered before the American Political Science Association, New York City, 09 9, 1966)Google Scholar.

³² For a discussion of Rayburn's use of this informal institution, see MacNeil, op. cit., pp. 82–84.

³³ McCormack disavowed his support of H.R. 10264 after an uneasy bipartisan coalition came apart on the floor of the House during the amendment stage: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 20 (March 16, 1962), p. 429.

³⁴ “In Detroit in January, 1957 only 18 percent of the people could correctly name the Congressman from their own district, and only 13 percent knew the names of both United States Senators from Michigan…. The world of the political activists and the newspapers which report political events is much more remote from the world of the average citizen than is generally realized”: Katz, Daniel and Eldersveld, Samuel J., “The Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the Electorate,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (Spring, 1961), 1–24, 20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar “The electorate sees very little altogether of what goes on in the national legislature. Few judgments of legislative performance are associated with the parties, and much of the public is unaware even of which party has control of Congress. As a result, the absence of party discipline or legislative results is unlikely to bring down electoral sanctions on the ineffective party or the errant Congressman”: Stokes, Donald E. and Miller, Warren E., “Party Government and the Saliency of Congress,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 26 (Winter, 1962), 531–546, 545.CrossRefGoogle Scholar It seems clear that the electorate does not bring down electoral sanctions upon the ineffective party in the sense of the responsible party doctrine. However, members of Congress, particularly Representatives in the minority party, seem to interpret large-scale shifts in seats won or lost as a judgment on their party image and the calibre of its leadership.

³⁵ Kaplan, Abraham, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco, 1964), pp. 346–351.Google Scholar