Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-nr4z6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-10T02:37:00.915Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Democratic Innovation: South Africa in Comparative Context

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Ian Shapiro
Affiliation:
Professor of Political Science at Yale University.
Get access

Abstract

This review essay of four recent books on democratic transitions is written from the standpoint of contemporary South African politics. Each of the books takes the Schumpetarian model of democratic politics for granted, and in the course of evaluating them the author explores the advantages and limitations of that model for thinking about the prospects for democracy in South Africa. He concludes that the Schumpeterian model diverts attention from questions that should concern promoters of democracy. The most important such questions deal with the internal structure of political parties, public organizations, and civil institutions.

Type
Review Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1993

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For my account, see Dahl, Robert and Shapiro, Ian, “Impressions from the Soviet Union,” Dissent (Summer 1991), 342–45.Google Scholar

2 Schumpeter, , Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942).Google Scholar

3 See Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).Google Scholar

4 For many of the standard arguments, see Shapiro, Ian and Reeher, Grant, eds., Power, Inequality, and Democratic Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988).Google Scholar

5 On this contentious subject, see Mostert, Noël, Frontiers: The Epic of South Africa's Creation and the Tragedy of the Xhosa People (New York: knopf, 1992)Google Scholar; and the penetrating review of that work by Coetzee, J. M., “A Betrayed People,” New York Review of Books (January 14, 1993), 810.Google Scholar See also Young, Crawford, “The African Colonial State and Its Political Legacy,” in Rothchild, Donald and Chazan, Naomi, eds., The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988).Google Scholar

6 See Vail, Leroy, ed., The Creation of Tribalism in South Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989).Google Scholar

7 Anecdotal evidence supports this contention. On a visit to the former USSR in June 1992 this author found widespread informal estimates that over 80$ of the population was living in poverty in the major cities, with the figure for Moscow over 90$. These estimates seemed credible from walking the streets, but systematic data on this question were impossible to come by.

8 Indeed, it is more extreme. See Wilson, Francis and Mamphela, Ramphele, Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge (New York: Norton, 1989), 18ff.Google Scholar The authors provide evidence that by the late 1970s South Africa's gini coefficient was the highest of any country in the world for which data were available.

9 For a more elaborate critique of Przeworski and others for paying insufficient attention to such internal divisions, see Swenson, Peter, “Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden,” Worki Politics 43 (July 1991)Google Scholar; and idem, “Labor and the Limits of the Welfare State,” Comparative Politics (July 1991).

10 Quoted in New York Times, December 21, 1992, p. A7.

11 See Akenson, Donald, God's Peoples (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 295310Google Scholar; and Alberts, L. and Chikane, Frank, eds., The Road to Rustenberg (Cape Town: Struik Christian Books, 1992).Google Scholar

12 In this connection there is some evidence, contra Przeworski, from the former communist world that democracy and liberalization can be most strongly supported by the groups that suffer most during transitions. See the poll from Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Samara, reported in Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), March 12, 1992.Google Scholar

13 Furthermore, such a theory could not be tested empirically, since nothing would count as a falsifying instance.

14 Huntington, Samuel, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?Political Science Quarterly 99 (Summer 1984).Google Scholar

15 Di Palma's discussion of minimalism verges on the disingenuous insofar as he insists that “in the interests of democratization the corporate demands of business and the state may have to take precedence over those of labor, even when labor, after a long period of autocratic repression, may actually be escalating its demands.” Labor, on his view, should therefore be compelled to trade off economic benefits for political gains (p. 97). Assertions of this kind, unsupported by any systematic evidence in the book, belie the claim that Di Palma's minimalist view of democracy does not load the distributive dice.

16 Linz, Juan, “Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration,” in Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pt. 1, 34ff.Google Scholar

17 As in his advice on how to deal with the military in a fledgling democratic order: Give them toys. That is, provide them with new and fancy tanks, planes, armored cars, artillery, and sophisticated electronic equipment (ships are less important; navies do not make coups). New equipment will make them happy and keep them busy trying to learn how to operate it. By playing your cards right and making a good impression in Washington, you will also be able to shift much of the cost to the American taxpayer. You then gain the added benefit that you can warn the military that they will only continue to get these toys if they behave themselves because nasty U.S. legislators take a dim view of military intervention in politics, (pp. 252–53)

18 Moore, Barrington Jr, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 413–32.Google Scholar

19 For one useful empirical discussion in the Egyptian context, see Rutherford, Bruce, “Can an Islamic Group Aid Democracy?” in Chapman, John and Shapiro, Ian, eds., NOMOS XXXV: Democratic Community (New York: New York University Press, 1993).Google Scholar

20 The acronym stands for Conference on a Democratic South Africa, a set of roundtable negotiations that were set up in 1991 to plan for the transition and the new constitution. Most major players participated in CODESA until its suspension in mid-1992; some separatist conservative Afrikaners and the revolutionary Pan Africanist Congress did not participate.

21 New York Times, February 19, 1993, pp. A1, A7.

22 The impression that this shift in strategy had occurred is based on public statements and actions by the players, as well as interviews with people close to the principal negotiating partners conducted by this author during visits to South Africa in May and December 1992.

23 For evidence that substantial violence was emanating from both political extremes, see Jeffery, Anthea, “Spotlight on Disinformation about Violence in South Africa,” Spotlight, no. 8 (October 1992)Google Scholar, published by the South African Institute of Race Relations.

24 In this connection we await the results of important research on Ubuntu by Jiyane, Ziba, “Securing Democracy and the Rule of Law in South Africa” (Ph.D. diss., Yale UniversityGoogle Scholar, in progress).

25 Bentley, , The Process of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908)Google Scholar; Truman, David B., The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951).Google Scholar

26 Robert Dahl's study of New Haven, Connecticut, was the classic of this genre; see Dahl, , Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).Google Scholar

27 Hartz, , The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955).Google Scholar See also Dahl, Robert, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).Google Scholar

28 For a good account of the history of the pluralist argument and an elaboration of its logic, see Miller, Nicholas R., “Pluralism and Social Choice,” American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983).Google Scholar

29 See Foner, Eric, “Why Is There No Socialism in America,” History Workshop Journal 17 (Spring 1984)Google Scholar; Wilentz, Sean, “Against Exceptionalism: Class Consciousness and the American Labor Movement,” International Labor and Working Class History 26 (Fall 1984)Google Scholar; and William Domhoff, G., Who Really Rules? (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978).Google Scholar

30 See Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).Google Scholar

31 Lijphart, Arend, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21 (January 1969), 215–15, 222.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

32 See Dahl (fn. 26).

33 See Wood, Gordon, Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (New York: Norton, 1969), 3124.Google Scholar See also idem, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1992).

34 Apter, David, Ghana in Transition (New York: Atheneum, 1963), 203–6.Google Scholar

35 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point.

36 Walzer, Michael, “The Idea of Civil Society,” Dissent (Spring 1991), 302–3.Google Scholar Tocqueville makes this claim most explicitly while discussing the relative merits of Catholicism over Protestantism in democratic systems. See Tocqueville, Alexis de, Democracy in America (New York: Anchor, 1969), 449, 450–51.Google Scholar

37 For elaboration of this view, see Shapiro, Ian, “Three Ways to Be a Democrat,” Political Theory 22 (February 1994).Google Scholar