ABSTRACT
Representational plurality consists, by definition, in the mind holding two (or more) potentially incompatible representations. But this definition does not specify the mind’s structural state as it holds this plurality. Does representational plurality entail a more or less permanent fragmentation of the mind, or is cognitive cohesion still an option? An isolationist perspective conceives plurality as set of independent representations. This approach appears reasonable for treating some aspects of plurality. However, the chapter aims to elaborate a different – integrationist – perspective, where a plurality of representations is integrated in larger cognitive structures. The author suggests that at least two kinds of larger structures could bring some cohesion to the plurality. First, by acknowledging different cognitive values to the different representations, some order is created and these representations cease to be entirely independent cognitive objects. Second, more binding relationship between the two (or more) representations could consist in integrating them into an elaborate explanation, where successes and failures of each act as part of the explanation. The author suggests that such ordering and explanatory cohesion might be thought as constitutive of the nature of expertise in a pluralist context.
