Transactions of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers
Online ISSN : 1883-8189
Print ISSN : 0453-4654
ISSN-L : 0453-4654
Constructions of Optimal Affine Incentive Strategies in Multilevel Stackelberg Games by a Vector Space Approach
Koichi MIZUKAMISiying ZHANGHua XU
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1989 Volume 25 Issue 3 Pages 298-303

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Abstract

In this paper, three-person deterministic Stackelberg game problems with a linear hierarchical decision structure are considered in a general Hilbert space setting. The existences and the constructions of the optimal affine incentive strategies for both the leader and one of the followers are studied by a vector space approach. A special class of problems are solved as an application of the theory, and the explicit optimal affine incentive strategies are obtained.

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